2017-05-24晓纯 高考英语作文


  Talk of a new Silk Road may be intended to evoke romantic, non-threatening images of desert caravans, ancient ships and trade in exotic commodities. But China’s grand plan for a network of railways, highways, pipelines and ports across central Asia, and around Southeast Asia is generating anxiety in New Delhi.

  With the 3,488km border between the two Asian neighbours still a matter of formal dispute, Indian strategic policy analysts are divided on whether China’s new Silk Road project is a strategic and economic threat to their country — or an opportunity. Many see the project — which the Chinese have called One Belt, One Road (OBOR) — as something that must be carefully navigated, as Beijing develops large projects in countries that India considers part of its natural sphere of influence. However, New Delhi lacks the financial power to offer a credible alternative.

  “The Indian government is very careful about the way it handles the China rhetoric, and it isn’t ready to come out arms swinging against OBOR, but it is sitting with its arms folded making it very clear that it will not endorse the project if it doesn’t like the way it was put together as a Chinese fait accompli,” says Shashank Joshi, a senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, a British defence and security think-tank.

  “They cannot be seen to be outwardly hostile to a scheme which many smaller Asian neighbours view as a good opportunity for large flows of Chinese capital that India cannot deliver,” he says.

  Brahma Chellaney, professor of strategic studies at New Delhi’s Centre for Policy Research, sees China’s new Silk Road initiative as a repackaging — in more palatable terms — of China’s so-called “string of pearls” strategy, which India views as an attempt to strategically encircle it.

  The “string of pearls” theory argues that Chinese investment in ports in south Asia is a precursor to developing overseas naval bases. China has, for example, already built a major port at Hambantota in Sri Lanka, which overlooks important shipping lanes that carry much of the world’s oil trade, and which India views as strategically important for its own defence.

  The visit of Chinese submarines at the Colombo port in 2014 raised fears that the facility’s purpose is not economic but military. Chinese investment is also planned for ports in Bangladesh and Myanmar, raising concerns that they may serve a dual purpose.

  “The new Silk Road is just a nice new name for the strategy they’ve been pursuing,” says Mr Chellaney. “They’ve wrapped that strategy in more benign terms. The Chinese dream is pre-eminence in Asia, and this goes to the heart of that dream.”

  “It’s not just a trade initiative,” he says. “What China is doing has a strategic element that is increasingly obvious.”

  India is most exercised about plans for a $$46bn economic corridor linking China and Pakistan, India’s nuclear-armed neighbour and rival. That blueprint envisions goods travelling from China’s western region to Pakistan’s Gwadar, a once sleepy Arabian Sea port now run by the China Overseas Port Holding Company. It is considered a staging point between central Asia and the Gulf.

  Part of the corridor will pass through Pakistan-held Kashmir, a territory that is still the subject of a decades-old, unresolved dispute between India and Pakistan. Indian analysts say that acceptance of the corridor would effectively acknowledge Pakistan’s rights over the territory now under its control, while India’s own claims over Kashmir have yet to be resolved — something New Delhi considers unacceptable. “This is a large scale project bringing People’s Liberation Army personnel [said to be guarding some project locations] right into the heart of what India considers to be occupied territory,” Mr Joshi says.

  At a recent conference in Gwadar, Pakistan’s Army Chief, General Raheel Sharif, accused India of deliberately attempting to undermine the project. “India, our neighbour, has openly challenged this development initiative,” he said. “We will not allow anyone to create impediments or turbulence in any parts of Pakistan.”

  But wary as India may be of Chinese ambitions, analysts say New Delhi needs to take a measured approach to the new Silk Road, and embrace individual components.

  India is already a member of the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which will finance much of the infrastructure, potentially giving it some leverage over how the plan unfolds.

  “For every belt they create, and every road that we create, can we create a slip road that connects Indian opportunities to the larger global market rather than reject it outright?” asks Samir Saran, of the Observer Research Foundation. “Can we?…?use their institutions to our own advantage?”



  在这两个亚洲邻居之间3488千米的边界仍然处于正式纠纷状态的情况下,对于中国“新丝绸之路”项目是否对印度构成战略和经济威胁,抑或带来机遇,印度的战略政策分析人士意见分歧。很多人认为,必须谨慎应对中方所称的“一带一路”(One Belt, One Road)项目,因为中国将要在印度认为属于其天然影响范围的一些国家开发大型项目。然而,新德里方面缺乏提供可信替代选择的财力。

  “印度政府对待中国的措辞非常谨慎,它没有准备好跳出来明确反对‘一带一路’,但是它双臂交叉坐着等待,表明如果它不喜欢这个项目被当作中方既成事实的方式,它就不会支持该项目,”英国国防和安全智库——皇家联合军种研究院(Royal United Services Institute)高级研究员沙善?乔希(Shashank Joshi)表示。


  新德里政策研究中心(Centre for Policy Research)战略研究教授布拉马?切拉尼(Brahma Chellaney)把中国的“新丝绸之路”计划视为——以更容易让人接受的方式——对中国“珍珠链”战略的重新包装;印度把这一战略视为中国企图对其实施战略包围。





  印度最担心的是连接中国和巴基斯坦的460亿美元经济走廊计划;巴基斯坦是印度的邻国以及对手,拥有核武器。按照该计划的蓝图,商品将从中国西部运往巴基斯坦的瓜达尔港(Gwadar)。瓜达尔曾经是坐落于阿拉伯海之滨的一个沉寂的港口,如今由中国海外港口控股有限公司(China Overseas Port Holding Company)经营。它被认为是中亚和海湾地区之间的中转点。


  最近在瓜达尔召开的一次会议上,巴基斯坦陆军参谋长拉希勒?谢里夫上将(Raheel Sharif)指责印度企图破坏该项目。“我们的邻国印度公开叫板这个开发项目,”他称,“我们不会允许任何人在巴基斯坦任何地方制造障碍或引起动荡。”



  “对于他们创建的每一带和每一路,我们能不能打造一条匝道,让印度的机遇与更大的全球市场互联互通,而不是把这个计划一概拒之门外?”新德里观察者研究基金会(Observer Research Foundation)的萨米尔?萨兰(Samir Saran)称,“我们能把他们的机构为我所用吗?”



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